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ASSIGNMENT.

A customer owed a firm of stockbrokers money on certain securities carried for him on a margin and the firm
made a general assignment, whereupon the cusAdvances
to
tomer tendered payment of his debt to the
AssIgnee,

assignee, and demanded the securities, which

were refused because the firm had pledged the same as collateral. 'Thereafter the customer, in order to release his
securities, advanced the market price on the day of redemption which enabled the assignee to redeem the securities primarily liable, such sum being largely in excess of the
amount of his debt. Under these facts the Court of Appeals
of New York holds In re Price, 63 N. E., 526, that the customer was entitled to payment in full, and in preference to
general creditors, for the amount advanced beyond his debt,
which increased the assets in the hands of the assignee. The
judges dissent. No authorities are cited.
BAILM ENT.

A. took wheat to a public warehouse and elevator, and had
it stored at the owner's risk of fire, and agreed to pay a cerwarehouseain price for storage. The custom of the wareman
houseman was in such cases to commingle grain
so deposited for storage with like quality belonging to him,
and from such mass to sell from time to time and replenish
with such other grain as should be brought to him for stor-.
age or that he should buy. Of this custom A. was fully
informed. The identical wheat so stored by.A. was sold by
the warehouseman. After this a fire consumed the warehouse with its- contents, including enough wheat of the
quality stored by A. to replace the same. Under these facts
the Supreme Court of Kansas hold in Moses v. Teetors, 67
Pac. 526, that A. could not recover the value of his wheat
from the warehouseman who had at all times kept on hand
sufficient in quality and quantity to replace all wheat stored
by A. Cf. Chase v. Washburn, I Ohio St. 244.
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BANKRUPTCY.

In re Philadetphia& Lewes Transp. Co., 114 Fed., 403,
the Uriited States District Court (Eastern District Pennsylvania) holds that a carrier corporation is not

omorations.
subject

ThrCeto

-

engaged in trading or mercantile pursuits, so
as to bring it within the Bankruptcy Law of

1898, subjecting thereto corporations "engaged principally
in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing or mercantile
pursuits." "I feel sure," says the court, "that, if Congress
had intended to subject such well-known and important
classes of corporations as railroad, steamship, express, telegraph.and other companies engaged in commerce, to the
operation of the bankrupt act, they would have been named
directly and specifically, or else the act would have contained
such
all-embracing terms as were used in the act of 1867,-"'all moneyed,
business, or commercial corporations and stock
companies.'
In McDonald v. Brown, 51 Atl. 213, the Supreme Court
of Rhode Island holds -that under the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, c. 3, § 17, providing that a discharge in
Effect of
Discharge;
bankruptcy shall not release judgments in acJgmelt for tions "for willful and malicious injuries to the
person of another," a judgment for libel against
a bankrupt recovered prior to the bankruptcy proceedings,
is not cancelled by a discharge in bankruptcy, and the surety
on the bankrupt's bond in the libel action cannot plead such
discharge in defence to a suit on the bond. The court
admits that the question is new, but cites as analogous and
in support of this position the cases of Disler v. McCauley,
71 N. Y. Supp. 949 and In re Freche, 1O9 Fed. 620.

BANKS.

The Court of Appeals of New York, against the dissent of
three judges holds, in Cassidy v. Uhlnann, 63 N. E. 554,
Uabity
that where a bank director has absolute knowlof
edge that the bank is hopelessly insolvent, and
Directors

fails to take such steps as lie in his power to

close the bank for business, and takes part in any arrangement which permits the bank to be kept open and deposits
to be received, he is. personally liable for damages to a
depositor who is ignorant of the insolvency, and whose
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deposits were thereafter received, though the director has
expressed an opinion that deposits should not be received,
and an arrangement has been entered into for the receipt,
under proper restrictions, where such arrangement was subsequently abandoned. The case presents an exhaustive discussion of the questions involved and an elaborate review of
authorities.
The use of signature cards as a part of modern banking
methods is well known. In Shoe Lasting Mach. Co. v.
Signature
Western Nat. Bank of City of. New York, 75
Cards

N. Y. Supp. 627, the New York Supreme Court

(Appellate Division, First Department), dealing with aquestion arising from their use, holds that where the treasurer of a foreign corporation opened a bank account with the
defendant, and at the same time handed it authorized signature cards to 'guide it in the payment of checks drawn
thereon, which cards contained the signatures of both the
president and the treasurer, the defendant was not authorized to pay checks signed by the treasurer alone, and was
liable to the corporation for the sums so paid.

BENEFIT SOCIETY.

In Bottjer v. Supreme Council American Legion of
Honor,75 N. Y. Supp. 805, it appeared that a benefit society,
organized to relieve sick members, and to proChange of
By-Law
vide for the families of those who might die,
issued a certificate to the wife of a member on his agreement
to comply with all the laws of the order then in force, or
which might thereafter be adopted. Later, under a power
in the constitution, after the issue of the certificate, the
Supreme Council enacted a by-law reducing the death benefit if a member died by suicide. The husband thereafter
committed suicide, and it was held by the New York
Supreme Court (Trial Term, Kings County) that the vested
rights of the widow were not impaired by the by-law. The
court regards the question as involved in serious difficulty,
but holding that the right of the wife is vested, it decides
that the by-law cannot have a retroactive effect so as to
impair pre-existing obligations.
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BILLS AND NOTES.

A firm of which A., who was insolvent, was a member,
and which owed money to a firm composed of A. and B., at
their instance to protect the interest of A. in
Fra
upon
such debt from his creditors, executed, a note
Creditors
for the amount of the debt to B.'s wife, B. repre.senting her in the matter. Under these facts the Supreme
Court of Arkansas, the Chief Justice dissenting, holds that
B.'s wife, having constructive notice of the facts, and the
note being for an illegal purpose, so that half of the consideration was illegal, and the note being an entirety, it was
void not merely as to creditors, but between the parties:
McTighe v. McKee, 67 S. W. 754. Compare Crawford v.
Morrell, 8 Johns. 253.
Where a debtor executes a note and mortgage for a loan
of money at a lawful rate of interest, and, at its maturity,
Usurious
enters into a new contract with the lender for.
Extension; a further extension of the loan, which is tainted
Effet
with the vice of usuty, and the lender, by agreement, retains the note and mortgage as collateral security
to the usurious contract, in a suit to enforce the mortgage
security the lender is restricted in his recovery to the amount
due on the indebtedness at the time of making the usurious
contract, after which all interest is forfeited (under statutory regulation): Supreme Court of Nebraska in Chicago
Lumber Co. v. Bancroft, 89 N. W. 78o. One judge dissents holding that the giving of the renewal note, by which
it was agreed to pay an illegal rate of interest upon the
loan did not operate to make the original note and mortgage
usurious, and hence rights arising under it as to interest
would be unaffected by this subsequent transaction.
In Aniba v. Yeomans, 39 Mich. 171, the Supreme Court
of Michigan held that an indorsement, "I hereby transfer
Negotiability

my right, title and interest of the within note to

X.," destroys the' negotiability of the instrument on the ground that it did not purport to transfer the
entire interest. That case is distinguished in Coddington
Savings Bank v. Anderson, 89 N. W. 787, where the indorsement read: "For value received, I hereby assign and
transfei the within bond, together with all my interest in
and rights under the mortgage securing the same to X.
without recourse." This latter indorsement it is held does
purport to transfer the entire instrument.
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BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS.

A foreign building and loan association, having no office
or general agent in Mississippi, but having special agents
in various towns throughout the state, with
What
Law
authority to solicit subscriptions for stock, reGoverns?

ceive applications for loans, and receive pay-

ment of dues, interest and premiums, loaned money to a
shareholder residing in Mississippi, on property located
there, the contract providing that payments should be made
at the association's office in the foreign state. Under these
facts the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds, in National
Mutual Building and Loan Ass'n of New York v. Brahan,
31 Southern, 840, that the contract, notwithstanding the
recital as to the place of payment, was a Mississippi contract, and governed by the laws of Mississippi as to usury.
CARRIERS.

While a common carrier may not by contract absolve
itself from liability for its own negligence under the prevailing rule, the decision of the Court of Appeals
Limitation
of Kansas City in Anderson v. Atchison, T. &
of Liability,
Burden of
S. F. Ry. Co., 67 S.W. 7o7, shows that-a conProof
tract limiting liability may be of importance in
its effect upon the burden of proof. It is there held that
when a carrier not capable of contracting 'against liability
for negligence contracts against liability for loss by delay
in a shipment of freight, the shipper, in an action for damages resulting from delay, has the burden of showing that
the delay was caused by the carrier's negligence.
By a decision of three to two, the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, First Department) holds, in
Harrison v. Weir, 75 N. Y. Supp. 909, that
Deat
of
where a carrier receiving dogs for shipment by
Animals
a certain train ships them by an earlier train,
and, no one being present to receive them, returns them to
the place of shipment, and the shipper, learning of their
return, directs them to be reshipped on the next day, without
in any way providing for them, he is not entitled to damages for the death of one of the dogs resulting from the
long confinement, the proximate cause of the death being,
in the view of the majority, the neglect of the shipper to
have the dogs attended to before their reshipment.
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CARRMERS (Continued).

In Monnier v. New York'Cent. and H. R. R. Co., 75 N.
Y. Supp, 521, it appeared that the plaintiff went to a railEztra Fa.

road station eight or ten minutes before the

arrival of a train, and applied for a ticket, but
could not get it, because the agent was absent and did not
return until the train left. The plaintiff boarded the train
and explained his inability to get a ticket to the conductor,
and tendered the fare to the point of destination. The conductor refused to take the fare unless five cents additional
was paid, and on plaintiff's refusal to pay this additional
sum, forcibly ejected him from the train. The New York
- statute authorized a railroad to demand from a passenger
riding on one of its trains five cents in addition to the regular fare when a ticket office established by it is kept open
for the sale of tickets at least one hour prioir to the departure
of each passenger train. Under. these facts the New York
Supreme Court (Apellate Division, Fourth Department)
holds that the eviction of the plaintiff was wrongful, on the
ground that such statute gave rio authority to demand the
.extra sum when the ticket office was not open for the sale
of tickets, and holds that a verdict of $500 is justified. One
judge dissents, on the ground that the plaintiff practically
invited the use of force, and was entitled to no substantial damages therefor: Townsend v. Railroad Co., 56
N. Y. 295.

The duty of a carrier to protect passengers from injury
and insult is applied in Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Phillio,
Waiting

67 S. W. 915, where the plaintiff suffered the

injury complained of while in the waiting-room
Rooms
of the carrier. The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas there
holds that where a carrier permits a person in a drunken
condition to enter its waiting-room, use indecent language,
and, being armed with a knife, to make an assault on a
female passenger, causing her .to become nervous and sickfrom fright, the carrier is liable, and a verdict for $400 is
not excessive.
The extent of the authority' of a conductor in fixing the
character of one who is carried upon the vehicles of the
carrier presents some close points. This quesTrespasser
tion was involved in Purple v. Union Pac. R.
Co., 114 Fed. 123, where the United States Circuit Court
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of Appeals (Eighth- Circuit) held that one who, 'knowing
that a conductor has no authority to grant free transportation, enters and rides upon his train with -the deliberate
intention not to pay his fare, under an agreement or under
a tacit understanding with the conductor that he shall ride
free, commits a fraud upon the railroad company, and is
not a passenger, but is a mere trespasser, to whom the only
duty of the company is to abstain from willful or reckless
injury. See and compare Duff v. Alleghany Valley R. Co.,
91 Pa. 458.
CONFLICT OF LAWS.

Negotiable interests continually present difficult questions
as to what laws govern the decision of the various issues
Notes;

arising in reference to them.

The Supreme

Court of New Hampshire holds in Limerick
National Bank v. Howard, 51 Atl. 64, that
where an indofsee in blank sues on a note executed and
payable in Vermont, and the evidence on the issue whether
he is a bona fide holder tends to show he had knowledge of
such facts as would lead a prudent person to suspect it was
obtained by fraud, on admission that in such case the law
of Vermont requires the issue to be submitted to the jury,
the court cannot direct a verdict on the ground that the
evidence does not show that the indorsee was not a bona
fide holder. The reason given is that the indorsee intended
to assume such contractual duties only as were involved in
the construction of a blank indorsement by the law of Vermont, and the question affected the substantial rights of the
parties which it was held should be determined by the law
where the contract was performable and not by the law of
the forum. Cf. Downer v. Chesebrough, 36 Conn. 39.
Bonn Fide
holder

CONTRACTS.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana holds in Perkins v.
Frazer, 31 Southern, 773, that a contractor who has unadRefusal to
visedly refused to perform his contract may,
Perform;
while the situation of things is unchanged, reRetracto,
tract the refusal, and go on with .the contract,
and is not cut off from so doing by the service upon him of
a notice to the effect that the contractee will hold such
refusal to be a default. Compare with this and with each
other Prattv. Craft, 2o La. Ann. 291, and Turner v. Collins,
2 Mart, (N. S.), 605.
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CONV"RSIOY.

In Industrial & General Trust v. Tod, 63 N. E. 285, it
appeared that the bondholders of an insolvent railway comIen-

pany pending foreclosure, conferred on a reor-

ganization committee title to the bonds for the
purpose of reorganizing the affairs of the railroad, and gave them power for that purpose, and required
the committee to adopt a plan of reorganization, and give
notice thereof, so that any -of the bondholders who were
not satisfied with the plan might withdraw from the agreement and recover back bonds which he had deposited thereunder. The committee was authorized to form'a new cortion of

Ralroa

poration and to purchase any of the assets and franchises
of the old company for the new corporation. The agreement further provided that the committee might construe
its provisions, and that their construction should be final,
and the committee should not be liable for- anything but
willfulmisconduct. Under these facts the Court of Appeals
of New York holds in a very elaborate opinion that an
action for conversion will not lie' against the members of the
.,committee for using the bonds to pay the price of the railway company on a sale on foreclosure, without first making
the plan of reorganization, and giving notice thereof, as
such failure was a breach of contract and not a conversion
of the bonds.
CORPORATIONS.

It is held by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Shadford
v. Detroit, etc., Ry., 89 N. W. 960, that where a street railconsom.ation; way company was composed of an actual conAssumption
solidation of other companies and has received
of Debts
and retains all their properties, it cannot deny
its liability on a debt due by one of such former companies,
on the ground that such consolidation was illegal, nor can
it contend that the original debtor was insolvent, and that
therefore plaintiff was not injured by the consolidation.
Where a president of a corporation, being a rival dominant, to certain unissued corporate stock, taking advantage
Unauthorized
Issuance of

of his position, but without authority, has the

treasurer issue it to him; in t suit to compel a
sy
surrender of the certificate the Court of Chancery of New Jersey holds that he is not obliged to surrender
it because of its unauthorized issuance, without regard to
whether or not he is- entitled to the stock: Lakewood Gas
Co. v. Smith, 5I Atl. 152.

PROGRESS 6F THE LAW.
DAMAGES.

It is held by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey in Jenkins v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 51 Atl.- 704,
that in an action of tort against a railroad
Difficulty
in
company for negligently operating its locomoEstimating
tives in such manner as to cause'them to emit
smoke denser and more offensive in quality and. greater in
volume, than reasonably required for the proper operation
of -the railroad, to the injury of the plaintiff's property,
situated near to the railroad, where the evidence shows such
negligent operation, and substantial damage to the plaintiff's
property, directly attributable thereto, it is erroneous-for the
trial court to limit the plaintiff's recovery to nominal damages, on the ground of the inherent impossibility of determining how much of the damage .was caused by smoke
necessarily emitted in the careful operation of the railroad,
and how much was caused by the smoke that was due to
negligent operation. In such case, it is said, the jury should
be left to make from the evidence the best evidence in their
power, as reasonable men, and award to the plaintiff compensatory damages for the actionable injury. Compare
Ogden v. Lucas, 48 Ills. 492.
DANGEROUS PREMISFS.

Where the owner or occupier of lands by express invitation induces a person to make use of a portion of the preminvitationto

ises for an expressed purpose his liability is

Enter
confined within the limits of the invitation and
does not extend to injuries received by the person invited
while using the premises for a purpose not expressed, and
not authorized by the invitation. Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey in Ryerson v. Bathgate., 51 Atl. 7q 8 .
It is on this principle that the case is distinguished by the
court from the recent case of Furey v. Railroad,51 Atl. 505,
which followed the older case of Phillips v. Library Co.,
55 N. J. Law, 307.
ZIECTRIC RAILROADS.

Though a traveler driving upon or in close proximity to
the tracks of a street railway is bound to look ahead to
Travelers,
see whether a car is liable to come in collision
AlongTracks with him, it cannot be said as a matter of law,
the Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Tunison v. Wea-.
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ELECTRIC RAILROADS (Continued.

dock, 89 N. W. 703, that he is bound to be constantly looking backward for that purpose, so as to be free from negigence.
ESTOPPEL.

"The Supreme Court of Delaware holds in Baird v. Har-

.per, 51 Atl. 141, that estoppel acting only against the perAdministrator son who did the act or those claiming under
him, if he did the act individually or in some
capacity other than as administrator, he will not be estopped
thereby when acting as administrator.

In order to suc-

cessfully invoke this doctrine against an administrator, it
must be shown that the act was done, or the admission made
by him in such character and not individually. Cf. Kellerman v. Miller, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 443, Wright v. De Groff,
14 Mich. 164.
EVIDENCE.

It is generally considered the'province of the court to pass
on the preliminary question§ which determine whether a
Dying
dying declaration as to the cause of death is
Declarations

admissible, but in Young v. State, 40 S. E.

iooo, the Supreme Court of Georgia holds that if the injured person was in fact in articulo mortis, and the circumstances were such as to indicate that he must have known
that this was so, it is proper to allow the declarations to
be proved, and instruct the jury to determine for themselves whether or not the statements made by the deceased
were "conscious utterances in the apprehension and immediate prospect of death." See Stephen on Evidence,
Article 26.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

A contract of separation between husband and wife provided that, in consideration ofcertain money and other propSeparation
Agreement,

erty paid by the husband, the wife forever dis-

Dower
charged her husband, his heirs and executors,
from any claims and demands in law and equity. The
question subsequently arose whether this included a release
of dower and the Supreme Couft of South Carolina holds in

Moon v. Bruce, 40 S. E. 1030, that as a claim for dower

never could exist against her husband since it could not
arise until his death, the instrument was insufficient as a
release of dower.
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JUDGMENTS.

The Supreme Court of Michigan hold§ in McBryan v.
Universal Elevator Co., 89 N. W. 683, that a, judgment
Conclusiveness Against

Stockholders

against a corporation on a note is not conclusive against the stockholders, but in a suit to
enforce *the stockholders' liability for
payment

of it, they may show that the consideration failed because
the payee took back the property for which it was given.
Cf. Bohn v. Brown, 33 Mich. 258, where the court said: "If
the proceedings against the corporation should appear to be
tainted with fraud or collusion between the claimant and the
corporation, the judgment would not be good as* inducement, or as an adjudication to fix the liability of the stockholder through it, or to fix the amount, and the suit against
the stockholder would fail inevitably."
LIBEL.

In Stuart v." News Pub. Co., 51 Atl. 709, the Court of
Errors and Appeals of New Jersey holds that though the
Justflcation; fact that the matter alleged to be libellous had
Damages
been, previous to its publication in a newspaper
(I) a matter of common rumor; or (2) found in affidavits
charging the plaintiff with the offence, which had been filed
with a justice of the peace; or (3) found in a petition for
divorce which had been filed in chancery by a complainant,
charging that the plaintiff had committed the offence published, is not legal ground for a justification of the publication of the libel, nevertheless such facts are proper to be
taken into corisideration by the jury in determining what
damage the publication has done the plaintiff.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

In Williams v. Greenville, 40 S. E. 977, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina holds that where a drainage ditch
Drains;
constructed by a municipal corporation becomes,
Recovery
through its negligence, the depository of dead
animals, and so-choked that water overflows the premises
of one residing near by, and the condition of the drain
causes illness in his family, he cannot recover from the corporation for physician's bills, medicines, increase in expenses
of his family or for his loss of time, but that he might recover for any damage done to his land by the overflowing
of the drain. One judge dissents regarding the distinction
as one without substance.

PROGRESS- OF THE LAW.
NEGLIGENCE.

The doctrine of identification by which in certain cases a
child isbarred from recovery by the negligence of a parent
Contributory is applied by the Court of Appeals of Maryland
Negligence;
in Mayor, etc., of City of Cumberland v. Lottig,
Identification
in a case where a mother, with her vounk child
and others, went on the roof of a building in which she lived,
in the night time, to watch a play in a theatre across the
street, and placed the child s6 that he could get hold of an
electric light wire, though she knew of its presence and
warned others against it. The child having been injured
-was refused recovery on account of such negligence on her
part.
The gefneral rule that the voluntary alighting from a
moving train, where one is not urged to do so by any emAlighting
ploye of the railroad company, constitutes negfrom Moving ligence, is well known; but how difficult it is to
Train
arrive at any satisfactory legal rule as to negligence in particular cases appears from Toler v. Yazoo,
etc., R. Co., 3' Southern, 788, where the plaintiff's testimony was that she went immediately to the -steps of the
car when the station was called, and it being dark and
she, thinking the train had stopped, got off, and was injured, the train being in motion, and it further appeared
that thereafter the train was again stopped, by the ringing of the bell, to let off other passengers. These facts
the Supreme Court of Mississippi holds are sufficient to be
submitted to the jury upon the question of the plaintiff's
negligence.
PARTIES.

With three judges dissenting the Supreme Court of
Kansas holds in Stewart v. Price, 67 Pac. 553, that one
Re4 party
in

Interest

holding by written assignment an itemized, veri-

fled account, is notthe real party in interest, and
cannot maintain an action in his own name,

where it is shown that by a contemporaneous oral agreement
he had agreed to pay the full amount thereof when collected,
to his assignor; and this it is held, is true notwithstanding
the assignor testifies that the defendant in the action dQes
not owe her anything, and that the whole amount is due her
from the plaintiff, and that he is to pay her provided he
recovers in the action. This holding is supported by the
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decisions in Indiana, Swift v. Ellsworth,'IO Ind. 205, but
is contrary to the general interpretation of the Code. In
general the result of the interpretation of the "real party in
interest" section of the Code is that the rights of an assignee
to sue have in some cases been broadened, but in none narrowed.
PHYSICIANS.

A physician holding himself out as having special knowledge and skill in the treatment of particular diseases is
Specialists
bound to bring to the discharge of his duty to
a patient employing him as such specialist, not merely the
average degree of skill and knowledge possessed by general
practitioners, but that special degree of skill and knowledge p6ssessed by physicians who are specialists in the
treatment of such disease, in the light of the present state
of scientific knowledge: Appellate Court of Indiana in
Baker v. Hancock, 63 N. E. 323.
RAILROADS.

The principle which prevails in most jurisdictions that
a common carrier cannot limit its liability for negligence is
Limitation of extended by the Supreme Court of Vermont in
Liability
Tarbell v. Rutland R. Co., 51 Atl. 6, to the case
where the contract is not between the company and the person subsequently injured but between the company and the
next of kin of such person, the court holding that a contract
between a railroad company and the next of kin of an employe, whereby the next of kin released the railroad from
all damages that might accrue to him by reason of the railroad's negligence, is void as against public policy.
ROBBERY.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Jackson v. State,
40 S. E. IOOI; that though a valuable article in proximity

to and under the protection of its owner is constructively upon his person, suddenly snatching
it up and carrying it away with intent to steal it, is not
robbery, when there is no intimidation of the owner for the
purpose of getting possession, and no resistance by him to
the act of taking. This, it is said, is none the less true when
What
Constitutes
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the article thus taken is a weapon, or capable of being used
as such, and the wrongdoer, after taking it, therewith intimidates the owner in order to effect an escape. See
Clements v. State, 84 Ga. 66o.

SPECIFIC PEREORMANCE.

It is held by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Park v.
Minneapolis,etc., Ry. Co., 89 N. W. 532, that where a contract is so indefinite in its terms that a court of
Indefinite
Terms
equity cannot decree specific performance, the
court will not retain jurisdiction to award damages for a
breach in the absence of any reason being shown why such
damages should not be recovered at law. "Only in exceptional cases," says the court, "where unnecessary hardship
clearly demands, should courts of equity assume that province." See Combs v. Scott, 76 Wis. 662, 671; Cole v.
Getzinger, 96 Wis. 559.

STRZET RAILWAYS.

The Court of Appeals of New York holds in Peck v.
Schenectady Ry. Co., 63 N. E. 357, that the use of a city
street for a surface railroad operated by elecAbutting
tricity is an additional burden on the property
Owners;
Injunction
rights of the owners of the fee, subject to the
easement of the highway. And further that the question
whether an injunction restraining the construction of an
electric street railway on a street, the fee of which is in
abutting owners, shall restrict the construction of the railway until the payment of compensation and denying a perpetual injunction if such damages are paid, or whether
the injunction shall be made perpetual, leaving the railway company to its proceedings to condemn, is in the discretion of the court.
In Mayor, etc., of Newark v. State Board of Taxation,
51 Atl. 67, it is held by the Court of Errors and Appeals of
New Jersey that a street railway company owns
Taatlon
no interest in the soil of the highways over which its road
passes which may be taxed as real estate. But the inherent
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value of its property above the cost of reproducing the
material constituents of its line arises from its franchise,
which is subject only to state and not municipal taxation.
See State Board of Assessors v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J.
Law, 146.
STREETS.

A statute of New Hampshire (Pub. St. c. 72, § 4), contains a provision analogous to the statutes of other states,
providing for the assessment of damages for the
Discontinuance; Special discontinuance of a highway.. The Supreme
Damage
Court of that state holds in Cram v. City of
Laconia, that under this law only such damages as are not
common to the public, but are peculiar and special, and the
direct result of the discontinuance may be assessed, and
further, that a discontinuance leaving undisturbed the
highway in front of an abutter's premises,'connecting with
the general system of streets, though resulting in a diversion
of travel, and a consequential depredation of such owner's
property, impairs no vested right, and furnishes no cause of
action for damages. The court cites with particular approval the case of Smith v. Boston, 7 Cush. 254, where the
opinion of the court is delivered by Chief Justice Shaw. The
opinion in the case in hand is a particularly. able review of
the law upon the subject.

SURFACE WATER.

Where the overflow of a swamp on adjacent lands cannot
reasonably be foreseen, by the construction of a side track
by a railroad company without a ditch in conObstruction;
Overflowing
nection therewith, the company, if the side track
Land
is a reasonable use of the land, is not liable for
the injuries resulting from the original failure to construct
the ditch: Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Priest v.
Boston, etc., R. R., 51 _Atl. 667. The question whether the
railroad company should have foreseen the injury which
resulted from the construction of the side track without
the ditch, and the question of the reasonableness of the use
of the property, it is held, is for the jury. See and compare
Ladd v. Brick Co., 68 N. H. 185.

PROGPMSS OF THE: .LAW.
SURFACE WATER (Continued).

Against the dissent of five members of the court, the Court
of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey lays down the principle
that the diversion or altered transmission of strDiverslon;
Artificial
face water, caused by the erection of a building
Erection
upon and over which it is accustomed to flow,
affords no ground of action to a person who suffers injury by
reason thereof: Jessup v. Bamford Bros. Silk Mfg. Co., 5 1
Atl. 147. The court relies principally upon Bowlsby v. Speer,
31 N, J. Law, 351, in which it was said: "Neither the retention, diversion, repulsion, nor altered transmission of surface
water is an actionable injury, even though damage ensues."
Unless the land be left idle, it is said, it would be impossible
to enforce rigorously any other rule. On the other hand,
the dissenting judges contend that the correct rule is that an
owner of land may repel or divert the sufface water which
would otherwise come upon his land from the-land of an adjoining owner, or he may alter the course of transmission of.
such surface water without liability, to the owner of the
adjoining land, provided that in'so doing he does not collect
such surface water, and discharge it in a collected flow, in
unusual quantities or upon an unusual place on the adjoining land. If he does so, and the collected discharge produces injury he is liable to the adjoining owner for such
injury.
WATER COURSES.

Discussing the extent of the riparian rights of a municipality, the Supreme Court of Ohio holds, in City of Canton
:Munlcimilty

v. Shock, 63 N. E. 6oo, that an incorporated

municipality situated on a natural flowing
stream is, in its corporate capacity, a riparian proprietor,
having the rights and subject to the liabilities of such proprietor; and, further, that such municipality so situated has
the right to use out of such stream all the water it needs for
its own proper purposes, returning to the stream the water
not consumed in such use, but it may not materially diminish
the flow of water in such stream to the injury of a lower
proprietor, by supplying water from the stream to persons
outside of such municipality or to be transported away from
such city or by supplying to mahufactories for power purposes more than a reasonable share of the water considering
all the circumstances. See Railroad Co. v. Miller, 112
Pa. 34.

